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1. Prologue
In the summer of 1996, Tom Stranger met Thordis Elva. Tom, 18 years old, was an Australian
exchange student in Iceland, homeland of 16 year old Thordis. Tom and Thordis fell in love and as
boyfriend and girlfriend went together to the school’s Christmas dance. That night Thordis had too
much to drink. She started feeling sick, vomiting and drifting in and out of consciousness. Instead
of letting the security at the dance call an ambulance for Thordis, Tom decided to take her home.
When they got to Thordis’ home, Tom laid Thordis on her bed, started undressing her and for the
following two hours he raped her. A few days later they broke up and a little while later Tom flew
back to Australia. Both Tom and Thordis struggled with defining and understanding what happened
on the night of the Christmas dance. They both knew very well that something very wrong had
taken place. It took Thordis nine years to finally reach a point where she believed that what
happened to her was not her fault and that much of the suffering she had been enduring was a result
of what Tom had done to her. She finally wrote Tom a letter confronting him with what had
happened. Tom replied with a regret filled confession. That letter started an eight year
correspondence until they deicded that they needed to meet to talk about what had happened. They
decided to meet in South Africa for a week. Thordis wanted to find forgiveness and peace… and
Tom needed to be forgiven.1

2. Introduction
The term ‘forgiveness’ denotes a social practice that is as common as it is complex. Even though it
is such a common social practice, people will often disagree about what it involves, what its norms
are, what it aims at and what value it holds. This disagreement is, at least in part, due to the
complexity of the practice. It is a practice that usually involves multiple agents who are attempting
to deal with a state of affairs that is characterized by strong personal evaluations and which has
effects that can be very far reaching.
In one sense, forgiveness is a practice that most agents at some point realize their need for.
This could be as a result of being hurt and feeling a need, a duty or a desire to forgive. It could also
be a result of someone committing a deed for which they feel the need or desire to be forgiven.
Many have experienced some form of forgiveness in their lives. Many might be limited to the
experience of struggling with forgiveness while failing, or even refusing to give it. In a world where
one is confronted with the realities of war and genocide, sexual assault and rape, even with disputes

1

Cf. Elva and Stranger (2017). Throughout this paper there will be quotations from Thordis’ and Tom’s book
at the beginning of some of the chapters reflecting some of the concepts and ideas being discussed.
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and arguments between family members or friends, the issue of forgiveness is likely to become
thematic in our lives.
This paper takes a close look at forgiveness. As the title suggests, this paper is divided in
two sections. The first section provides a description and an understanding of the phenomenon of
forgiveness. This is done first by considering how various philosophical accounts have done so.
This is then followed by a phenomenological description of what forgiveness is and what
forgiveness does. For this purpose the paper also considers other concepts that are related to
forgiveness, namely those of guilt and resentment. In the second section of the paper the norms of
forgiveness are investigated. Two elementary normative conditions of forgiveness are discussed: the
conditions of moral permissibility and the conditions of performative actualization of forgiveness.

3. The Phenomenon of Forgiveness
3.1 Different Views on Forgiveness
The aim of this section is to provide a sample of a some of the different views on forgiveness. This
is not an exhaustive survey of all opinions philosophers and other theorists have had about the issue,
but it is intended to indicate the range of opinions that have been proposed. The first and second
sections will show some of the diversity that existed in ancient times by showing how the ancient
greeks and the authors of the new testament thought about forgiveness. The third and fourth
sections will deal with some modern and contemporary philosophers who also have entertained a
variety of opinions on the topic.
As the different opinions are surveyed it will become clear that a person’s understanding of
forgiveness will differ depending on their general understanding of the moral world and their
conception of human nature. For some authors, forgiveness would not be considered a virtue,
because their ideas of perfection or goodness are such that the perfect or good person does not have
a need to forgive. This is not to say that authors who do not think of forgiveness as a virtue agree in
their understanding of the world, their conception of the human condition or in their understanding
of forgiveness. However, these authors do hold ideas about the world and about human nature that
lead them to conceive of forgiveness as either unnecessary or non-virtuous. Other writers,
espousing different understandings of the world we live in and of human nature, consider
forgiveness a very highly regarded virtue.
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3.1.1 Ancient Greece
“It is surprising and illuminating that forgiveness is not seen as a virtue by the ancient Greek
philosophers,”2 writes Charles Griswold. The reason this is so, is not because they think revenge or
resentment is better than forgiveness (as Griswold understands it), but because the idea of moral
perfection in the thinking and writing of the ancient Greeks does not allow for forgiveness to be
considered among the virtues.
To illustrate his point, one might look at the way Aristotle dealt with the topic. In his
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle describes what he calls the great-souled (megalópsychos) person.3
This is an individual who Aristotle believes to have perfect virtue. A person who is perfectly
virtuous is one who clearly has nothing for which he needs to be forgiven. It seems that he is also a
person who has no need to forgive others. This person distances himself from those who are nonvirtuous. He does not “incline towards admiration, because in his eyes nothing is great, nor towards
remembering evils, because it is not characteristic of a great-souled person to harbour memories,
especially of evils, but rather to overlook them.”4 This also means that when the non-virtuous do
injure or wrong him, their injuries or wrongs are ineffective against him. He is not vulnerable. He is
“unable to live in dependence on another, unless he is a friend.”5 It is worth noting that in Aristotle’s
Metaphysics, his description of ‘the perfect being’ or ‘the cause of all things’ is that it is
independent, unmovable and unchanging.6 Granted, he was not talking about a human being, but it
nevertheless does reflect his ideas about perfection.
The Greek word, syngnóme, which Aristotle uses and can be translated as ‘forgiveness’, is a
word that has a wide range of usage.7 Aristotle usually uses it in a context where it can mean
excuse or pardon.8 He uses it, for example, when he describes how some people’s actions are not
voluntary but rather (in various ways) imposed on them. If that is the case, these people are to be
excused or pardoned.9 It is debatable whether or not this should be considered forgiveness.
According to Griswold, “[t]o forgive someone… assumes their responsibility for the wrong-doing
2

Griswold (2007): 2.

3 Aristotle,

NE, Book IV, Ch. 3.

4 Aristotle,

NE, 1125a2-4.

5 Aristotle,

NE, 1124a1.

6 Aristotle,

MET, 1073a5-14.

7

Griswold (2007): 3.

8

Griswold (2007): 4-6.

9 Aristotle,

NE, Book III, Ch. 1.

6

indeed, what distinguishes forgiveness is in part that it represents a change in the moral relation
between wrong-doer and wronged that accepts the fact that wrong was indeed done, and done (in
some sense) voluntarily.”10 If that is how one understands forgiveness it would seem that Aristotle
has little to say about it.
Griswold believes this to be the case in general with the ancient Greeks. After citing Plato,
Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans he concludes
“that forgiveness (as distinct from pardon, mercy, lenience, compassion, and excuse) is not a
virtue within these perfectionist ethical schemes … The character type on whom such
theories are focused, and which they hold up as the moral exemplar, is perfect or like-theperfect, and thereby rises quite distinctly above the merely human. Forgiveness is more
appropriate to an outlook that emphasizes the notion of a common and irremediably finite
and fallible human nature, and thus highlights the virtues that improve as well as reconcile
but do not aim to «perfect» in the sense we have been examining.”11
Gregory Sadler, however, takes issue with Griswold’s interpretation of Aristotle. He argues
that it is not necessary to restrict what counts as forgiveness to situations where the wrongdoer is
not pardonable or excusable. If this is so, then Aristotle has indeed much to say about forgiveness
and it would be right to translate syngnóme with the term ‘forgiveness.’ Sadler sees forgiveness as a
“choice not to engage in available responses of revenge and retribution… and giving up of negative
affective responses and affective dynamics such as anger, hatred, indignation, distrust, or
ressentiment.”12 This, of course, is a possible reaction if a person has been wronged, regardless of
whether the person who has committed the wrong has done so voluntarily or involuntarily.
In this sense, Sadler sees Aristotle’s great-souled person as a forgiving person. He believes
that ignorance or involuntary action of the wrongdoer are among the reasons why a wronged person
should not take revenge and should give up her negative emotions towards the person who wronged
her. Sadler goes on to argue that forgiveness is part of the virtue of mildness or even-temperedness,
which is “the virtue bearing on, directing and tempering anger.”13 Indeed, if one accepts Sadler’s
definition of forgiveness and then reads Aristotle, one could see how Aristotle’s discussion of the
anger of a mild or an even tempered person makes space for forgiveness. In fact, Aristotle writes:
“The even-tempered person professes to be calm and not carried away by his feelings, but to
be cross only in the way, at the things, and for the length of time that reason directs. And he

10

Griswold (2007): 7.

11

Griswold (2007): 14.

12

Sadler (2008): 232-233.

13

Sadler (2008): 241.
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is thought to miss the mark more in the direction of the deficiency, because the eventempered person is inclined not to revenge so much as to forgiveness.”14
It becomes clear that how one defines forgiveness will play a role in whether or not one will
find it in the writings of the ancient greeks. It seems that, linguistically at least, the greek noun
sometimes translated as forgiveness was closely tied with many other related concepts. Therefore, it
can be said that the greeks had a concept of syngnóme which one can understand to be in significant
ways related to what some thinkers today would consider forgiveness to be.

3.1.2 The New Testament
In Before Forgiveness, David Kostan argues that in the New Testament “there is nothing like a
systematic philosophical interrogation of the concept [of forgiveness] and seeking one is likely to
be a frustrating exercise.”15 It is understandable that one does not find in the New Testament a
“system philosophical interrogation of the concept” of forgiveness because the New Testament is
not a systematic philosophical text. One will not find a systematic interrogation neither of
forgiveness, nor of any other concept for that matter. The nature of the text, which consists partly of
narrative and partly of letters written by various individuals to various groups of people, invites the
reader to search for the concept in a different manner.
Konstan also disagrees with Arendt, who believes that the “discoverer of the role of
forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth.”16 He believes that even though
we have in the New Testament “at least the germ of the modern conception of forgiveness,”17
nonetheless “a fully developed conception of forgiveness as an interpersonal, human process is not
yet present.”18 It is important to note that Konstan considers a specific conception of forgiveness to
be the modern conception of forgiveness, which is very similar to that espoused by Charles

14 Aristotle,
15

NE, 1125a31-1126a3.

Konstan (2012): 122-123.

16 Arendt

(1998): 238.

17

Konstan (2012): 122.

18

Konstan (2012): 124.
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Griswold.19 It is this conception that he compares to what he takes to be the conception of
forgiveness found in the New Testament.
Even though there are only a few passages which directly address the issue of forgiveness in
the New Testament, it can be argued that the whole New Testament revolves around the topic. It is
generally agreed upon that the event upon which the New Testament is centered is the story of the
life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. The four gospels tell the story of this life, the letters are
intended to be teaching the various christian communities how to live in light of that story. It is also
generally agreed upon that, according to the authors of the New Testament, one of the main things
accomplished through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the forgiveness of sins and
reconciliation with God. The Apostle Paul describes his whole mission as a “ministry of
reconciliation” and clarifies further that “this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to
himself … that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself, not counting their trespasses
against them.”20 Elsewhere he describes what he believes God has done for the world as
“redemption, the forgiveness of sins.”21
Even though this is clearly referring to God’s forgiveness, the Apostle Paul does seem to
believe that there is a strong parallel between God’s forgiveness for us humans and our forgiveness
for one another. He writes: “bearing with one another and, if one has a complaint against another,
forgiving each other; as the Lord has forgiven you, so you also must forgive.”22 In this sense, it is
possible to read out of the New Testament a lot of ideas concerning what forgiveness is and how
one ought to forgive, not only from passages that directly talk about it, but also from the general
narrative of the whole collection of writings that comprise it. The specific passages that do mention
forgiveness should be understood within the context of the rest of the New Testament. There is no
space here to deal with this issue in detail. Rather this section will only consider one of the key

19 A good

summary of the conception of forgiveness espoused by Griswold in Forgiveness: A Philosophical
exploration is found in Nussbaum’s Anger and Forgiveness: “Forgiveness… is a two-person process
involving a moderation of anger and a cessation of projects of revenge, in response to the fulfillment of six
conditions. A candidate of forgiveness must 1. Acknowledge that she was the responsible agent 2. Repudiate
her deeds… and herself as the author 3. Express regret to the injured at having caused this particular injury to
her 4. Commit to becoming the sort of person who does not inflict injury and show this commitment through
deeds as well as words 5. Show that she understands, from the injured person’s perspective, the damage done
by the injury 6. Offer a narrative accounting for how she came to do the wrong, how that wrongdoing does
not express the totality of her person, and how she is becoming worthy of approbation.” Nussbaum (2016):
57.
20

2 Corinthians 5:18-19.

21

Colossians 1:14.

22

Colossians 3:13.
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ideas concerning the conception of forgiveness which seems to be found both in specific texts and
also in the greater narrative of the New Testament.23
In the New Testament it seems to be the case that God is deeply involved in every act of
forgiveness. This is true whether one is considering God’s forgiveness or interpersonal forgiveness.
This is expressed for example when Jesus teaches his disciples to pray: “forgive us our debts as we
also have forgiven our debtors.”24 In this instance, as in the previously mentioned quotation by the
Apostle Paul, God’s forgiveness for us and our forgiveness for others are strongly connected. The
involvement of God in every act of forgiveness is also clear in passages which suggest that any
action or attitude any one has towards another is related to a person’s relation to God. The Apostle
John writes that “if anyone has the world's goods and sees his brother in need, yet closes his heart
against him, how does God's love abide in him?… If anyone says, "I love God," and hates his
brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen cannot love God whom
he has not seen.”25
It is therefore possible to see that the authors of the New Testament believed the love of God
and the forgiveness of God to be the paradigm for the love and forgiveness humans ought to have
for one another. The New Testament describes God’s love and his forgiveness as a gift given to
humans “while [they] were yet sinners.”26 The New Testament authors believed forgiveness to be
something one ought to do for others, not because they deserved it, but because they believe that
God, first of all, has forgiven them (the wronged forgivers) while they were undeserving. And this
forgiveness is a result of a love for the person who has committed the wrong. It is an action one
takes in order to make reconciliation possible.
Taking it a step further, it seems that at the core of New Testament’s command to forgive
is an awareness that God is a forgiving God and that we are people who need forgiveness, but
who have also been wronged. Behind the connection between the individual’s asking God for
forgiveness and the individual’s forgiving of others is the assumption that each individual finds
herself as both the wrongdoer and the wronged before God. The Christian narrative then goes on
to say that God becomes man and unites himself with humans in their condition. He becomes an
innocent man who dies the death of a criminal. In his death as an innocent man he unites himself
with every wronged, and in his death as a criminal he unites himself with every wrongdoer. In
It is interesting to note that the New Testament does not use syngnóme for ‘forgivneness’, but the word
that is in most cases translated as forigive/forgiveness is aphiēmi/aphesis.
23

24

Matthew 6:12.

25

1 John 3-4.

26

Romans 5:8.
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his death, all those united with him, somehow die as well. The Apostle Paul expressed it this
way: “For the love of Christ controls us, because we have concluded this: that one has died for
all, therefore all have died; and he died for all, that those who live might no longer live for
themselves but for him who for their sake died and was raised.”27
The Christian idea is that God unites himself with humans so that in his death they die as
well. Volf writes, “The Christ who died is the Christ who rose again. The [person] who died as a
sinner with Christ was raised with Christ to new life… The person is a new self, because she
lives in Christ and Christ lives in her.”28 This is the experience that is usually referred to as
conversion. This new self is a self that is no longer guilty. It is a self that has experienced the
costly love and forgiveness of God. It is also a self that sees Christ as taking on her wounds and
sufferings. As one who suffers with her and is able to forgive, Christ gives her the power to
forgive. As God unites himself with every wronged person, being himself wronged along side
every wronged person, and being a God who is capable of forgiving, those who are united with
him find themselves able to forgive as they imitate his forgiveness. Only God is big enough and
powerful enough to forgive evil with the magnitude that is seen in this world, and it is therefore
God who forgives and makes humans forgivers.
It does seem that there are things that would be too difficult and too costly for the
wronged to forgive. The Christian narrative suggests, however, that human forgiveness is a
reflection and an extension of the forgiveness of God. If this is true, then it might be possible to
forgive even the kinds of evil that would have left people severely hurt and without hope. The
Apostle Paul sums this up as:
“Therefore, if anyone is in Christ, he is a new creation. The old has passed away; behold,
the new has come. All this is from God, who through Christ reconciled us to himself and
gave us the ministry of reconciliation; that is, in Christ God was reconciling the world to
himself, not counting their trespasses against them, and entrusting to us the message of
reconciliation.”29
3.1.3 Nietzsche and Nussbaum
Friedrich Nietzsche and Martha Nussbaum are two philosophers who seem to have more of a
negative view of forgiveness. Even though they would probably disagree on many issues, they do
share a common rejection of the idea of forgiveness being virtuous. In order to understand their

27

2 Corinthians 5:14-15.

28

Volf (2005): 149.

29

2 Corinthians 5:17-19.
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positions it is important to investigate some of the other concepts that are closely related to their
conception of forgiveness, such as anger, resentment and elements of their notions of justice and
retribution.
Starting with Nietzsche, one can clearly see that forgiveness does not fit comfortably within
his ideas about morality. He writes:
“… impotence which doesn’t retaliate is being turned into «goodness»; timid baseness is
being turned into «humility»; submission to people one hates is being turned into
«obedience» (actually towards someone who, they say, orders this submission – they call
him God). The inoffensiveness of the weakling, the very cowardice with which he is richly
endowed, his standing-by-the-door, his inevitable position of having to wait, are all given
good names such as «patience», also known as the virtue; not-being-able-to-take-revenge is
called not-wanting-to-take-revenge, it might even be forgiveness («for they know not what
they do – but we know what they are doing!»). They are also talking about «loving your
enemies» – and sweating while they do it.»”30
Nietzsche’s intellectual attitude towards forgiveness seems to stem from a similar root as
that of the ancient greeks. His ideas about how one ought to live if one were to fulfill their potential
do not leave any place for forgiveness. For Nietzsche, the strong man is not easily affected by what
others do. In fact, “[t]o be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds
seriously for long – that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of a power
which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one forget.”31 When he describes forgiveness as
“not-being-able-to-take-revenge,” he is not saying that one ought to take revenge. But he thinks that
the weak are those who want to take revenge, but are not able to and so; in order to hide their
inability they pretend it to be a lack of desire to retaliate and consider this a virtue.
Nussbaum rejects what she thinks is the contemporary common idea of forgiveness for different
reasons. In Anger and Forgiveness, she begins by analyzing anger. She builds on Aristotle’s
definition of anger, which states that it is “a desire accompanied by pain for an imagined retribution
on account of an imagined slighting inflicted by people who have no legitimate reason to slight
oneself or one’s own.”32 She agrees with most of this definition, but then goes on to suggest that the
idea of retribution is one that, even though common, is irrational. She believes there are two reasons
why people want retribution. The first is a result of a “magical idea” that when the person who
wrongs me suffers, I will be better off.33 Alternatively one can think of retribution as a way to deal
30

Nietzsche (2006): 27-28.

31

Nietzsche (2006): 22.

32 Aristotle,
33

RH, 1378a31-33.

Nussbaum (2016): 21-22.
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with what she calls a “status-injury”; the idea being that when someone wrongs me, my relative
status is decreased and therefore I am motivated to retaliate. Retaliation is then the means through
which I will restore my relative status. Nussbaum describes this way of thinking as being “at the
heart of infantile narcissism”.34
Nussbaum then argues that there is a better way to be angry. Instead of anger having to focus
on the suffering of the wrongdoer or on restoring relative status, anger should focus on social
welfare “Saying, «something should be done about this,» [Transition-Anger] commits itself to a
search for strategies.”35 She calls this kind of anger “Transition-Anger” and thinks that this is the
road any rational person ought to take eventually. Other kinds of anger are human and are
experienced by most people, however the rational person will quickly dismiss them and replace
them with Transition-Anger.36
Having described anger in this way, she begins to explain how this is related to the most
common ideas of forgiveness. Summing up her view, she writes:
“The «road» of forgiveness begins, standardly, in terrible anger over a wrong one has
suffered at the hands of another. Through a typically dyadic procedure involving
confrontation, confession, apology, and «working through,» the wronged person emerges
triumphant, unburdened from angry emotion, her claims fully acknowledged, ready to
bestow the grace of non-anger. That is what I call «transactional forgiveness,» and it is both
enormously influential historically and very common today. It is plausible to think of it as
the canonical form of forgiveness in today’s world … In short, forgiveness of the
transactional sort, far from being an antidote to anger, looks like a continuation of anger’s
payback wish by another name.”37
Nussbaum strongly rejects this idea of transactional forgiveness. She then suggests that there
is a better form of forgiveness that is found in the New Testament. She calls it “unconditional
forgiveness.” This is forgiveness that does not expect anything from the wrongdoer. They are
forgiven whether or not they repent. Even though Nussbaum considers this a much better
alternative, she still finds it lacking. To speak of unconditional forgiveness is to say that one is
angry with the person, but decides to put aside her anger without conditions. For Nussbaum the
problem remains that anger is not the appropriate or rational reaction to being wronged. Anger
keeps the individual focused on the past wrong. She thinks there is still a better way to deal with
wrongdoing.38
34

Nussbaum (2016): 29.

35

Nussbaum (2016): 36.

36

Nussbaum (2016): 30-31.

37

Nussbaum (2016): 10-11.

38

Nussbaum (2016): 75-78.
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The way that Nussbaum recommends is the way of “unconditional love.” In this scenario the
wronged individual is not angry, is not focused on the past wrongdoing, but is mainly focused on
what can be done for a better future. She thinks this strand is also found in the New Testament
writings. She refers to the father in the parable of the prodigal son39 as an example of this kind of
love. The father runs and embraces the son without any repentance or any calculation where we can
see the father putting his anger aside. In such a story she sees no forgiveness, only unconditional
love.40
It is interesting that Nussbaum will not call what the father does in the parable of the
prodigal son forgiveness. Once again, we see that depending on how one defines forgiveness, one
will or will not find it in certain stories or texts. Nussbaum’s analysis of anger and her ideas about
retribution are also not without problems. She does think there could be a place for something to be
done about the wrong, but only within a forward looking approach that is not rooted in the
traditional Aristotelean understanding of anger.41 This is however not the only way to think of
retribution. Neither is her way of thinking about repentance without problems. Thinking that
repentance is merely about the wronged party finding restored status or the central condition for
what she considers to be forgiveness is a very limited way of considering the phenomenon we are
interested in.

3.1.4 Kant, Arendt and Derrida
After having considered the ideas of Nussbaum and Nietzsche (two philosophers who do not see
forgiveness in a very positive light), this chapter will consider samples of modern and postmodern
authors who hold a more positive view of forgiveness.
Even though Immanuel Kant has written very little specifically about forgiveness, Konstan
argues that it is with Kant that the modern concept of forgiveness (as Konstan understands it)
begins. Konstan claims that Kant’s ideas “of moral autonomy and the consequent possibility of a
radical change of character; and some of the paradoxical implications of this new image of the
self”42 have inspired and made space for the modern concept of interpersonal forgiveness.
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes:

39

Cf. The Gospel of Luke, Chapter 15.

40

Nussbaum (2016): 78-81.

41

Nussbaum (2016): 36.

42

Konstan (2012): xi.
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“It is therefore a duty of men to be forgiving (placabilitas). But this must not be confused
with meek toleration of wrongs (mitis iniuriarum patientia), renunciation of rigorous means
(rigorosa) for preventing the recurrence of wrongs by other men; for then a man would be
throwing away his rights and letting others trample on them, and so would violate his duty
to himself.”43
The context of this statement is that of punishment. Kant begins this paragraph talking about
the importance of punishment, but also about the problem of revenge. He argues that an individual
has no authority to avenge crimes committed against himself, but that avenging the crime is the role
of the court, which is a reflection of the ultimate moral law giver, who therefore has the authority to
avenge crimes. He then reminds the reader that she ought not even ask God to take vengeance,
“partly because a man has enough guilt of his own to be greatly in need of pardon and partly, and
indeed especially, because no punishment… may be inflicted out of hatred.”44 It is interesting to
note here the relationship which Kant established between forgiving and being in need of
forgiveness oneself.
Even though Kant has written little that directly bears on forgiveness, David Sussman has
attempted to reconstruct Kant’s views on forgiveness through locating a place for it within the rest
of his moral philosophy and his religious writings. Sussman explains that Kant, in his religious
works, writes of God’s forgiveness to us. Sussman argues that, for Kant, “God serves as a kind of
moral archetype… If so, then perhaps the grace of God similarly serves as the kind of moral
archetype for the kinds of morally transformative and restorative relations that might, in various
imperfect ways, be within the realm of human possibility.”45 Sussman believes that the view of
God’s forgiveness found in Kant’s religious writings can also show us something true of human
forgiveness as well.
Sussman argues that Kant’s view of forgiveness can be thought of as considering the person
who has done wrong, not merely as he is at the time of doing the wrong, but as he can potentially be
in the future. When someone asks us for forgiveness “the supplicant asks us to trust in him enough
to reestablish a relationship through which he may become worthy of that very trust, although
nothing about him as he actually is now morally necessitates such an attitude.”46 In this sense,
forgiveness for Kant has a redemptive aspect. Sussman argues that for Kant, to forgive is to believe
that the person one is forgiving will become a person worthy of receiving that forgiveness. This
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shared belief between the forgiver and the forgiven and the relationship it enables might actually be
the cause of the person becoming worthy of the forgiveness.
Hannah Arendt offers a different perspective when dealing with the topic of forgiveness; she deals
with the issue of forgiveness in the context of writing about political theory. Arendt writes about
forgiveness in The Human Condition. In order to properly understand what she is saying about
forgiveness it is important to understand her general framework in the book and how forgiveness
relates to it.
In The Human Condition, Arendt begins by introducing a distinction within human activity
between “labor”, “work” and “action.” “Labor is the activity which corresponds to the biological
process of the human body,”47 she writes. In other words, labor is all activity that an individual does
in order to provide for the necessities of her life. “Work is the activity which corresponds to the
unnaturalness of human existence… Work provides an «artificial» world of things, distinctly
different from all natural surroundings.”48 Arendt calls “work” the kind of activity where we build
and construct unnatural structures within which we continue to exist and that may outlive us. Arendt
then introduces the term “action” as “the only activity that goes on directly between men without
the intermediary of things or matter, [it] corresponds to the human condition of plurality and to the
fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world.”49 “Action” for Arendt is the human
capacity to create new human relationships. She thinks of “action” as a political activity; an activity
that contributes to humans insofar as they live in relations to one another.
Arendt writes on forgiveness as an “action” that is the remedy for what she calls “the
predicament of irreversibility.” Because “action” is creating something new, it is many times the
case that the result is unpredictable and possibly problematic. What ever “action” we take will be in
our past and the past is irreversible. It is a problem when we realize that the action we have taken is
a problematic one, but we have no way of changing the fact that we have taken such an “action.”
The solution for this predicament is in the fact that further “action” can be taken. One such further
“action” is forgiveness. Arendt writes:
“[Forgiveness] is the only reaction that acts in an unexpected way and thus retains, though
being a reaction, something of the original character of action. Forgiving, in other words, is
the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly,
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unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences
both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven.”50
Even though Arendt does not give a clear definition of forgiveness, she does state that to be
forgiven means to be “released from the consequences of what we have done.”51 For Arendt this is
significant because in “action” we do not know exactly what the consequences will be. This
inability to know what the consequences will be is the main reason why Arendt thinks that an action
is forgivable. In fact, she contrasts actions that are forgivable, because the actors “know not what
they do,”52 with willed evil, which she believes is very rare. In another passage she describes such
unforgivable actions as “radical evil,” and comments that “all we know is that we can neither
punish nor forgive such offenses and that they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and
the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy wherever they make their
appearance.”53
Arendt goes on to explain that forgiveness is an action that stems out of love in a specific
limited sphere and out of respect in the “larger domain of human affairs.”54 This is because
forgiveness is always releasing an individual, for her sake, for who she is, from the consequences of
an action she has committed. The action is forgiven for the sake of the individual who committed
it.55 This is why forgiveness, as well as trespassing, is a political action. It is an action that can only
exist among a plurality of individuals sharing one space of action and existing in a “web of
relations”.56
Jaques Derrida offers a more complex and somewhat confusing view on forgiveness. In “On
Forgiveness”, he begins by attempting to distinguish between a practice that is commonly called
forgiveness, but that he considers to be impure. This is a practice that he does not consider wrong,
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but that he does not want to confuse with pure forgiveness. The examples he gives of this practice
are mainly political examples, where a process that is called forgiveness is undergone with the aim
of reconciliation and moving forward. Derrida believes that pure forgiveness must be done with no
other purpose in mind. He writes:
“… each time forgiveness is at the service of a finality, be it noble and spiritual (atonement
or redemption, reconciliation, salvation), each time that it aims to re-establish a normality
(social, national, political, psychological) by a work of mourning, by some therapy or
ecology of memory, then the ‘forgiveness’ is not pure – nor is its concept.”57
The way Derrida conceives of this kind of conditional forgiveness is similar to the kind of
forgiveness Nussbaum writes about. In fact, he calls this kind of forgiveness which is only granted
when the right conditions are met, an economic forgiveness. This is forgiveness that is granted “in
the course of a scene of repentance attesting at once to the consciousness of the fault, the
transformation of the guilty, and the at least implicit obligation to do everything to avoid the return
of evil.”58
Picking up the idea of ‘the unforgivable’ from Vladimir Jankélévitch59 and Arendt, Derrida
begins to argue that “forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable.”60 Derrida believes that this is the
only kind of forgiveness that is pure. The problem however, is that it seems that this pure
forgiveness is not practically possible. He goes on to describe a tension that exists between the pure
unconditional forgiveness and conditional forgiveness. “These two poles… are absolutely
heterogenous, and must remain irreducible to one another. They are nonetheless indissociable.”61
Even though he considers conditional and unconditional forgiveness to be totally different from one
another, he seems to think that they are both involved when it comes to actually making the
decision to forgive:
“… if one wants, and it is necessary, forgiveness to become effective, concrete, historic; if
one wants it to arrive, to happen by changing things, it is necessary that this purity engage
itself in a series of conditions of all kinds (psycho-sociological, political, etc.) It is between
these two poles, irreconcilable but indissociable, that decisions and responsibilities are to be
taken.”62
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It is difficult to think of what this looks like in practice. Derrida seems to want to save
forgiveness from being an economic practice that has clear rules. It is important for him that
forgiveness maintains its status as something that is in a sense impossible, and yet it is something
that we must do. For him “forgiveness is not, it should not be, normal, normative, normalising. It
should remain exceptional and extraordinary, in the face of the impossible: as if it interrupted the
ordinary course of historical temporality.”63 Commenting on Derrida’s views on forgiveness
Richard J. Bernstein writes:
“Derrida in all his writings has been obsessed with decision and responsibility. The
obsessive motif is that there are no algorithms, no rules, no decision procedures, nothing that
we can rely on in making decisions – including decisions about when, whom, and what to
forgive… When Derrida tells us that forgiveness is an impossible possible, he is not playing
frivolous games with us. He seeks to intensify the experience of decision and responsibility
involved in forgiveness.”64
Derrida’s view of forgiveness builds on and combines the views of some of the other authors
mentioned in this paper. He brings together the ideas of transactional forgiveness and of the
unforgivable and uses them to present a more complex view of how forgiveness works. As is typical
of Derrida’s work, he deconstructs the binary framework that exists (conditional vs. unconditional
forgiveness) and attempts to show that these contradictions must be held together in tension.

3.2 A Description and Definition of Forgiveness
Forgiveness is a complex social practice. One can think of a myriad of cases where it is appropriate
to speak of forgiveness. Forgiveness can be seen to occur between two individuals, it can occur
between one individual and a group of two or more, it can be seen to become enacted between two
(or more) groups of individuals. An individual could forgive someone who is alive or someone who
is deceased. An individual may wish for forgiveness from someone who is alive or from someone
who is deceased. In some cases, one may experience the need or urge to forgive someone for a
wrong that was not committed against herself. There is also the issue of the forgiveness of God for
individuals, or in some cases some have even spoken of individuals forgiving God.65 This list of
options is definitely not comprehensive, it does however show that there are multiple possible
scenarios where one can appropriately speak of forgiveness and yet where it is possible to think of
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forgiveness as having a slightly different meaning and perhaps also as being played out in
accordance with different sets of norms.
In order to properly investigate the phenomenon this paper focuses on what has been called
the ‘paradigmatic case’ of forgiveness. This is the case where forgiveness is “understood as a moral
relation between two individuals, one of whom has wronged the other, and who (at least in the
ideal) are capable of communicating with each other.”66 This is the most elementary case of
forgiveness and so it is methodologically advisable to begin with it. The paper thus will investigate
what happens when an individual is wronged by another, and what the wronged party is doing when
she forgives. The paper will also investigate what the effects of this forgiveness are on both
involved parties. It is possible to then extract the conclusions of this investigation; on their basis one
might attempt their application to other cases in order to discern in what ways these other scenarios
are different and in what ways they are similar to the ‘paradigmatic case.’ This final step, however,
lies beyond the scope of the present work.

3.2.1 What is Forgiveness?
In what follows, I shall argue that some of the confusion regarding the phenomenon of forgiveness
has its origins in a certain ambiguity in the usage of the term ‘forgiveness’. ‘Forgiveness’ is a term
used in two senses: one is a usage referring to something that happens only within the wronged.
This can be seen when people talk of someone forgiving for herself, not for the wrongdoer. It can
also be the only option in situations where the wrongdoer is no longer available in the life of the
wronged. In such a situation, the wronged might attempt to forgive without any interaction and may
be without any effect on the wrongdoer. The other usage is a broader one that is usually considered
to be conditional and that includes reconciliation. This is the case when people talk of forgiving a
loved one for example. This is forgiveness that is enacted for the sake of restoring a damaged
relationship. A clearer case might be when the wrongdoer initiates the process of forgiveness. In
such a case the wrongdoer might apologize and ask for forgiveness, hoping that, being forgiven,
there might be hope for the relationship to return to the way it was before the wrongdoing.
Some use the term as though forgiveness only refers to the first sense mentioned here, while
others think that real forgiveness is only the second sense. In the following chapters an explanation
of what forgiveness is and what forgiveness does is provided, which will attempt to reconcile these
two positions by showing that forgiveness begins with the wronged and can even end there, but that
it will always create the potential for the second sense.
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Brandon Warmke has argued that forgiveness alters the norms of a relationship.67 There are
different norms that govern different kinds of relationships. These norms will be altered when
someone commits an evil action. The norms, and perhaps even the nature of the relationship, will be
different after such an action has been committed. These altered norms can be altered further by the
action of forgiveness. The alterations of the norms may be accompanied by emotional alterations,
but that is not necessary. The alterations referred to here are alterations in obligations, rights and
prohibitions within the relationship in question. It is important to note that the alterations of the
norms is not what forgiveness is, but it is the result of forgiveness taking place. When forgiveness
takes place the nature of the relationship and the individuals within the relationship change as well.
Forgiveness involves a change within the individuals that would make the alteration of the norms
understandable and possible. Any understanding of what forgiveness is must account for the
alteration of the norms that results as a consequence of its taking place.
In the following chapters, two different models are presented that attempt to guide us in our
understanding of what forgiveness is. The first model, which I will call the ‘bond model’, will give
an explanation of what is happening in the act and the process of forgiveness. The second model,
the ‘economic model’, provides a way of understanding what forgiveness accomplishes within and
for a relationship. Both models are compatible and will work together to give a fuller and clearer
understanding of what forgiveness is.

3.2.1.1 The Bond Model (What Forgiveness is)
“For a moment, we sit in silence, and it strikes me that in a way, we’ve got each
other’s initials forever carved into our skin.”68
An evil action creates a bond between the wrongdoer and the wronged. By ‘bond’ I mean something
that is holding both individuals together in a certain kind of relation. This bond (gradually) destroys
other bonds that may have existed before the wrongdoing took place. It also destroys the potential
bonds of a potentially healthy relationship between people who have never known one another. The
bond has an impact on the person and thereby can also negatively influence other relationships a
person lives in. This evil bond keeps people close to one another; this closeness, of course, is not
geographical, but rather relational. The wronged and the wrongdoer can neither be separated from
one another, nor can they create or sustain other healthy bonds with each other, unless this bond
caused by the evil act is resolved. The bond can be observed in the wronged as resentment against
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the wrongdoer and can be seen in the wrongdoer as guilt. It is possible that one or both parties be
not fully aware of the bond at all times. This does not mean that the bond does not exist.
Forgiveness is the act and the process of dissolving this bond created by the evil action. This act
will alter the norms of the relationship in such a way that restoration of the relationship becomes
possible. This could be through the reviving of previously existing bonds or restoring the potential
of creating new bonds between the wronged and wrongdoer.
The term ‘forgiveness’ refers to and expresses the idea of an act which a wronged party
takes to properly remove a bond between the wronged and wrongdoer that was created by the
wrongdoer through an action that can be properly described as an ‘evil’ action or a ‘wrongdoing’.
The action of forgiveness aims at releasing both the wronged and the wrongdoer from the bond
created by the evil action. However, it does seem possible for the wronged party to release her self
from the bond through forgiveness without the wrongdoer being released. The wrongdoer can only
be released from the bond when the wronged party has released herself. The release of the wronged
party from the bond, however, is only a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the release of the
wrongdoer. This suggests that the wronged is the one that holds the power to bring about the
necessary action for the release of both parties from the bond created by the evil action of the
wrongdoer. But there are other necessary conditions that the wrongdoer must fulfill in order for her
to be released from the bond. These conditions, however, are not necessary for the wronged to be
able to release herself. The bond is asymmetrical. Therefore, the action taken by the wronged party
to release herself from the bond created by the evil action, with the intention of also releasing the
wrongdoer, is called forgiveness, even if the wrongdoer does not fulfill the conditions necessary for
her release. In this case, the wronged would have forgiven, but the wrongdoer would remain
unforgiven. If the action of forgiveness is taken by the wronged and properly received by the
wrongdoer, the natural progression is that of reconciliation. This explains why forgiveness is
sometimes described in a way that includes reconciliation, while other times it refers only to the
release of the wronged party from the bond created by the evil action. The confusion thus is a
consequence of the fact that although forgiveness always aims at reconciliation, it does not always
attain it.
The bond created between the wronged and wrongdoer by the evil action of the wrongdoer
contains two strands of different directionality. One that moves from the wronged to the wrongdoer
and another that moves from the wrongdoer towards the wronged. The strand that moves from the
wronged to the wrongdoer can be described as being dominated by resentment and anger towards
the wrongdoer. It is a desire that the wrongdoer, as the one responsible for the injury, not live as if
she has not caused it. This is sometimes manifested as a desire for revenge. This is a desire to inflict
pain on the wrongdoer with the hope that the inflicting of that pain would restore some kind of
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balance and would somehow relieve the wronged from some of her pain. It is important to note that
the pain of the injury is not itself part of the bond. The bond can remain even in the absence of the
pain and the bond might be resolved even with the persistence of the pain. The second strand
moving from the wrongdoer to the wronged is a strand of guilt. Having committed an evil action
towards the wronged, the wrongdoer is now guilty. This guilt places the wrongdoer in a specific
relation towards the wronged, similar to that of being in debt. Within the bond we can thus
distinguish a strand of resentment and a strand of guilt.
Once the wronged decides to forgive, she is letting go of the strand that is moving from her
towards the wrongdoer. This allows the wrongdoer to begin letting go of the strand moving from
herself to the wronged. However, the conditions for the wrongdoer to let go are (i.) the wronged has
decided to forgive and (ii.) that the wrongdoer has repented. If the wrongdoer has not repented, the
guilt towards the wronged remains, even if the wronged has released her resentment and her
demands of the wrongdoer. In that case, it is the guilt of the wrongdoer that demands of her the
payment. It might be the case that the wrongdoer is unaware of her guilt, or is unwilling to accept
that she is guilty. This does not change the fact that she is guilty and that this guilt binds her to the
wronged, even when the wronged is no longer bound to the wrongdoer. This explains how it is
possible for the wronged to forgive, without the wrongdoer being forgiven. It is also possible that
the wrongdoer repents before the wronged decides to forgive. The wrongdoer will however remain
unforgiven, even though she has contributed her part in the process, until the wronged decides to
forgive.
The ‘bond model’ is helpful because it provides a way of thinking about and describing the
situation that makes forgiveness possible. It also provides a way of thinking about and describing
the action and the process of forgiveness. Next, the ‘economic model’ will be introduced. The
‘economic model’ provides a way to make intelligible what forgiveness accomplishes. It explains
the alteration of the norms which is an observable result of forgiveness taking place.

3.2.1.2 The Economic Model (What Forgiveness does)
“As a result, I’m going to South Africa to seek final payment for the costliest night
of my life”69
Richard Swinburne writes, “[b]y hurting you, I put my self in a moral situation somewhat like the
legal situation of a debtor who owes money. The wrong needs righting. There is an obligation to do
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something like repaying.”70 This analogy between moral debt and economic debt is at the core of
the economic model of forgiveness. It is very common to find the language of this model of
forgiveness being used when reading or talking about the topic. In the New Testament we find the
language and imagery of debt to talk about sins.71 Nietzsche makes a point of the fact that in
German, Schuld is the word for both guilt and debt.72 Even though this is a common way of
speaking, Griswold, among others, has argued that it is not a helpful way of speaking of
forgiveness.73 More recently, Warmke has developed and defended this model against some of the
objections that have been raised against it.74
Undergirding this model is the idea that individuals have certain obligations towards one
another. These obligations vary depending on the nature of relationship, however, there is,
according to Swinburne, a minimum obligation to have the “attitude of seeking no harm” for
anyone regardless of who they are.75 When one wrongs another person, one is then in position
similar to that of being in debt. One is in the position of owing the person something; what exactly
is owed is hard to define. One can think that one owes the person an apology, reparations, or maybe
to compensate for what has been lost or damaged. One of the reasons it is hard to define what
exactly is owed goes back to the complexity and variety in the nature of the evil actions that might
be committed. Some evil actions include material damage, while others do not. However, in all
cases we talk about the wrongdoer being in debt. It is the immaterial aspect of the wrongdoing that
is very difficult to quantify. It is even conceivable that sometimes the kind of debt acquired is one
which is impossible to repay.
The strength of the model certainly does not lie in the fact that it can quantify the debt, but
in the description of forgiveness as a cancelation of the debt. There are parallels between the kind of
relationship involved between parties in an economic debt situation and the kind of relationship
between parties in a moral debt situation. More importantly, the kinds of changes that occur once an
economic debt is canceled are similar to those that occur when moral debt is forgiven. It is precisely
the latter similarity that makes the economic model of forgiveness helpful. Warmke acknowledges
that there are disanalogies between the economic and moral debt, but he explains that “the issue is
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not whether there are disanalogies, but whether such disanalogies prevent the [economic model of
forgiveness] from being illuminating and helpful when thinking about the nature and norms of
moral forgiveness.”76
Warmke suggests that the most helpful way to think about this is in terms of the norms of
the relationship before and after forgiveness takes place. Once a person has wronged another, the
wronged is justified in treating the wrongdoer in certain ways. She might be even justified in
making certain demands of the wrongdoer. These demands would stem out of the wronged’s right to
blame the wrongdoer. However, once the wronged forgives the wrongdoer, she seems to be giving
up her rights to treat the wrongdoer in these same ways. Otherwise we would not be able to make
sense of what it means that the wronged has forgiven the wrongdoer. These alterations in the norms
of the relationship are the effect of forgiveness taking place.77
“Any plausible theory of forgiveness should be able to explain why the norms of interaction
between wrongdoer and victim are altered in paradigmatic cases of forgiveness,” writes Warmke.
He suggests that the way to explain these alterations is to think of forgiveness as having a similar
nature as economic debt cancellation. When a person cancels a debt, she cannot go on treating the
person who was indebted to her the same way (e.g. she cannot go on demanding payment from the
person). The economic model of forgiveness therefore is a helpful model in understanding what
forgiveness does. Forgiveness is an action of such a kind that it changes the norms of the
relationship in a specific way once it has been taken. The norms are altered in such a way as to
remove rights and obligations that would have made the possibility of the parties healing their
relationship close to impossible (depending on the severity of the wrong). This does not necessarily
mean that once forgiveness has taken place that the relationship is automatically restored. This only
suggests that forgiveness effectuates a certain change that makes the restoration possible.
In combining both models one can now get a clearer picture of forgiveness. Forgiveness is
the resolution of a bond that holds both parties in a specific kind of relationship. The resolving of
the bond means that the nature of the relationship between both parties has changed in a way that is
similar to the way the cancelation of an economic debt would change the relationship between the
parties involved.
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3.2.1.3 Further Definitions and Clarifications
3.2.1.3.1 What is Guilt?
“I am one of the ‘they’… the ones who have inflicted such hurt. The ones to be
feared. A bad man. A man who has committed sexual violence.”78
To call someone guilty is to say they have acted in a way they ought not have acted and that they are
responsible for their action. This is based on the premise that under certain conditions, individuals
are responsible for their actions. To talk about a person being responsible for an action is to say that
it is right to require a response from said person in regards to the action she has taken. The person is
the author of the act and she is thus expected to give an answer for it. When the action to be
answered for is good we speak of merit or adequacy, and we speak of guilt when the action is evil
or wrong. Therefore, we can say that guilt is a mode of being responsible. It is a description of
someone who is responsible for doing something they ought not have done.
The person, being the author of her act, could be responsible towards (at least) three
different parties. (1) The person is responsible towards the individual that is affected by their action.
The affected individual has a right to call the person who affected her to account. (2) The person is
also responsible towards the entity that is in charge of maintaining the laws within which
communities are sustained and flourish. This entity’s right to call a person to account is a derivative
right. It represents the affected in holding the effector to account. (3) Finally, the person is also
responsible towards the entity that has given her the power and authority by which she has acted.
Such an entity has a right to question the person about how she has acted using their power and
authority.
The account of forgiveness given in this paper assumes the reality of guilt. It assumes that
the wronged has a right to call the wrongdoer to account for their action. The wrongdoer’s guilt
means that she cannot distance herself from the action she has done. The wronged has the right to
treat the wrongdoer in certain ways because of the wrongdoer’s guilt. This is the situation that can
be described using the ‘bond model’ and has been likened to economic debt in the ‘economic
model.’
It is important to note that there is a difference between the reality of guilt, the
consciousness of guilt and the sting of guilt. There are times when all three are present in one
person. But there are times where one or more of them can be missing. A person may have a
consciousness of guilt and feel the sting of guilt while not being actually guilty. It is also possible
for a person to be really guilty while not having a consciousness of guilt. It has been argued by
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twentieth century German philosopher Nicolai Hartman that forgiveness can release someone from
the sting of guilt, but is not capable of releasing the person from the guilt itself.79 This means that
whether one is conscious of their guilt or not, is not a measure of whether they are really guilty or
not.

3.2.1.3.2 What is Resentment?
“My reflection in the window takes on the face of revenge: the cruel creature who
wanted to bring my tormentor to his knees. Growling softly, she stretches lazily
before meeting my eye. I licked your wounds, she purrs while flashing her claws.
You think you have the right to judge me now? I turn away from the apparition,
seeking solace in how far I’ve come through understanding and patience. Revenge
grabs hold of my chin with bony fingers and forces me to face her. Admit it, she
hisses. You enjoyed making him squirm. You’re wrong, I hiss back. It healed
nothing. Snarling, she retreats into the shadows. Her presence lingers, its
remnants pulsating through my body until sleep finally pushes me off the edge and
into the subconscious of the African night.”80

Much depends on properly thinking about resentment when dealing with the phenomenon and
norms of forgiveness. One reason for that is that it seems to be a promising way to describe what
the wronged experiences when considering or attempting to forgive. Another reason is that
forgiveness has been repeatedly defined as the forswearing of resentment.81 It is therefore important
to properly understand resentment and to consider whether the forswearing of resentment really
provides us with an adequate definition of forgiveness.
Pamela Heironymi has defended a version of the so called ‘Resentment Theory of
Forgiveness’ in “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness.”82 Hieronymi helpfully explains
that emotions, such as resentment, are “judgment-sensitive attitudes.”83 By that, she means they are
not mere forces, but that they are undergirded by specific judgments. If one were to overcome such
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an emotion, one would go about that by revising the judgments which undergird the emotion in
question. She argues that an account of forgiveness as the overcoming of resentment…
“… must articulate the revision in judgment or change in view in a way that allows the
forgiver to hold fixed the following three (interrelated) judgments: (1) The act in question
was wrong; it was a serious offense, worthy of moral attention. (2) The wrongdoer is a
legitimate member of the moral community who can be expected not to do such things. As
such, she is someone to be held responsible and she is worth being upset by. (3) You, as the
one wronged, ought not to be wronged. This sort of treatment stands as an offense to your
person.”84
The three judgements mentioned are necessary for justifying resentment. Hiernoymi goes on
to explain that to deny any of these three judgments might in fact remove resentment, but it should
not be considered forgiveness. This is because to deny any of these three judgments “absolves the
wrongdoer of culpability, and to absolve of culpability is to excuse, not to forgive.”85 Therefore, she
argues, we need to articulate an account of forgiveness that is uncompromising; one that includes a
“revision in judgment or a change of view” without denying any of the three emotions that
undergird resentment.
The solution proposed by Hieronymi is to realize that these three judgments, when true, lead
to a fourth judgment; “that the event in question makes a threatening claim.”86 It is a threatening
claim in the sense that it makes a statement about the wronged and the wrongdoer. About the
wronged it states that it is right to treat her this way, and about the wrongdoer it states that she
thinks it is right to act this way. This claim, according to Hiernoymi, reveals something about the
nature of resentment. Resentment protests these claims. Hieronymi argues that it is this fourth
judgment that actually “grounds resentment.”87 This fourth judgment can be undermined through an
apology by the wrongdoer. In an apology, the wrongdoer acknowledges that the action was wrong
and that she should not have done it. An apology is an admission that it was wrong to treat the
wronged this way. This would mean that the past action is no longer threatening. When this fourth
judgment is undermined, “resentment loses its footing.”88 Once the fourth judgment has been
undermined through the apology, resentment fades away. According to Hieronymi, forgiveness has
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taken place. It is important to note that Hieronymi does not claim that this is the only form of
forgiveness that exists.89
This account is helpful insofar as it provides a developed understanding of resentment.
There are, however, problems with this account. The first problem, raised by Warmke, consists in
the consequence that forgiveness is thus posited outside of the wronged's sphere of control. The
overcoming of resentment is a result of the review in judgment, which is a result of the apology.
Neither the apology, the review in judgment, nor the overcoming of resentment are actions that the
wronged willfully takes. This would result in all norms underlying forgiveness becoming
meaningless.90
The second problem with Hieronymi’s account of resentment is that it seems to be
incomplete. There is more to resentment than the issue of a threatening claim. If resentment is so
central to forgiveness, such that overcoming it is what forgiveness is, one would expect there to be
more to it than what is mentioned in this account. I would suggest that an important component of
what we mean by ‘resentment’ ought to be expressed in an additional fifth judgment: the act in
question has cost you something, and you deserve to be repaid by the person who has wronged you.
This judgment is in line with the economic model of forgiveness. It is also easy to observe this
judgment in the desire for revenge. The resentment the wronged feels seems to be demanding that
the wrongdoer pay. Moreover, it is often the case that the wronged not only desires that the
wrongdoer pays, but she desires that she herself make the wrongdoer pay.91 In other words, it is
common for the wronged to desire a payment to be made to herself, not just that a payment be made
in general.
This fifth judgment is not necessarily undermined by an apology. It is common to see people
who refuse to forgive even when an apology is given precisely because they believe that the
wrongdoer must pay. In the mind of the wronged, forgiving might mean that the wrongdoer will not
pay. In such a case, even when there is no threat, the wronged will hold on to her resentment. This
fifth judgment can only be undermined by an action. The wronged can decide to release the
wrongdoer from the cost she owes her (the wronged) and accept to pay it herself.92 It seems that this
action of release is a much better explanation of forgiveness than that of merely defusing the
threatening claim. It might be fruitful then to either maintain Hieronymi’s account of resentment
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while abandoning the idea that forgiveness is merely overcoming resentment, or updating
Hieronymi’s account of resentment to include the fifth judgment and maintain her definition of
forgiveness. In the former case, one could think of overcoming resentment as a part of the process
of forgiveness, but that forgiveness includes more than that.
It is also worth considering whether resentment can have distinctions similar to those drawn
in reference to guilt; can there be a distinction between the emotion of resentment and the objective
state that justifies the existence of the emotion? In such a case one could explain how sometimes
resentment is unjustified. One could also describe someone who is actually wronged while not
being conscious of her state and not experiencing the justified emotion. The word resentment does
not seem to be used except to designate an emotion, while the justificatory state is usually referred
to as ‘being wronged’, ‘being injured’, ‘being offended’ and the like.

4. The Norms of Forgiveness
The following chapter is divided into two parts, each dealing with one of the two different types of
conditions that come into play when thinking about forgiveness. The first type of conditions, I will
call conditions of moral permissibility. The question to be answered here is: are there conditions
that make forgiveness morally permissible or impermissible? In order to answer this question,
forgiveness must be placed within a larger moral framework. This is because it is only within moral
frameworks that any moral judgments can be made. The second type of conditions, I will call
performative conditions of the actualization of forgiveness. The question this section will attempt to
answer is: what conditions are necessary for the possibility of forgiveness in the first place? This is
a question about what capacities or elements need to be in place for forgiveness to be an act
possible for human beings. It will also discuss whether or not these conditions actually exist.

4.1 Conditions of the Moral Permissibility of Forgiveness
In the previous chapter the word ‘ought’ has been used multiple times. For Example, ‘guilt’ was
defined as being responsible for doing something one ought not have done. The word ‘ought’ in this
context assumes a moral framework. It is obvious that forgiveness is an action that makes sense
only within a moral framework, even if only because it is a (possible) response to a state of guilt,
which only makes sense in a moral framework. Forgiveness is, however, also an action that has
moral value in itself. When thinking of the norms of forgiveness, disagreement can arise about
whether one ought or ought not forgive. Settling such disagreements requires at least a sketch of the
framework within which this moral judgment is made.
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It is clear that people disagree, not only about moral judgments, but also about the moral
frameworks within which these judgments are made. Many of the disagreements about judgments
can be traced back to disagreements about moral frameworks. In attempting to sketch a moral
framework I am not attempting to convince the reader that this is in someway the ‘right’ moral
framework to adopt. Rather, I am attempting to provide a coherent moral framework within which
the description of forgiveness I have provided can be tested and shown to work, and on the
backdrop of which more general norms of forgiveness can be derived by considering a specific form
of its enactment within the introduced moral framework.
4.1.1 Forgiveness in a Moral Framework
“To show the world that people who’ve been both ends of this scale, whether
they’re receivers or perpetrators of sexual violence, aren’t soulless monsters or
damaged goods. They’re people; imperfect, fallible, unmistakably human beings
like you and me with all kinds of thoughts, jobs, backgrounds, life-styles, and
beliefs. People who pay their taxes and love their families and make mistakes and
live right next door.”93
According to Charles Taylor, thinking about moral issues is thinking that involves what he calls
‘strong evaluation’; “that is, [the issues] involve discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse,
higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather
stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.”94 Taylor argues that
moral thinking is done around three axes which overlap and are intertwined but are still distinct.
These are “our sense of respect for and obligations to others, and our understandings of what makes
a full life… [and] the range of notions concerned with dignity.”95 In order for a person to be able to
make any evaluations or judgments regarding any of these axes one has to have a background
picture, or a framework, out of which one is able to think about these axes and begin to make
judgments that would be considered moral, or ‘strong evaluations’. Indeed, as Taylor points out,
“frameworks provide the background, explicit or implicit, for our moral judgments, intuitions, or
reactions in any of the three dimensions.”96
Taylor believes that frameworks are inescapable, even though some people might not be
aware that they are acting and understanding their actions and those of others’ in their horizon. A
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person usually begins to realize that she acts and conceives of her actions in a framework when she
is in need of defending her moral position or an action she has committed. Because many people are
never challenged to explain why they believe their action or position is right, they don’t realize that
they act within a determinate conceptual horizon of practical intelligibility, i.e. of concepts, which,
on the most fundamental level, are constituting the intelligibility of action for them. Taylor explains
that “[t]he average person needs to do very little thinking about the bases of universal respect, for
instance, because just about everyone accepts this as an axiom today.”97
Along these lines, I will develop a moral framework in this paper beginning with the
following assumption: The greatest good, the summum bonum, for human beings is to be active in
what I will call ‘good relationships.’ The framework developed in this paper is one that sees human
beings as agents of such a kind who are capable of being in good relationships. This capacity is the
outworking of being human, which is what makes them worthy of respect and gives them dignity.
In other words, to be human is to potentially be capable of being in certain kinds of relationships.
What makes a human life worth living is the kinds of relationships that a person is actually in, or
can potentially be in.
This does not mean that in order to be worthy of respect and dignity one has to be in good
relationships, but that what it means to be human is to have certain characteristics that make it
possible to be in such relationships. The fact that these characteristics can be deformed or lost does
not make an individual less human, and so less worthy of respect and dignity, but it means that this
is a human who is challenged in some way or other, and so finds it difficult to reach her potential
and fulfill her humanity. Value and dignity are rooted ontologically not functionally. The person’s
humanity is what gives her value and dignity and it means having such potential.
Out of this framework one can begin to see what kind of judgments and what kind of actions
are good actions and which are bad. Actions that are compatible with and that build towards ‘good
relationships’ are good actions. Actions that destroy the potential or capacity for ‘good
relationships’ are evil actions.
Human Existence, – not only for sheer biological, but also for a number of other reasons – is
a social mode of existence, necessarily requiring coordination, cooperation and communication. A
social existence, in which we are constantly in need of, longing for and working towards good
relationships. This does not exclude other goods that we long for and work towards, but it seems
that all other goods are compatible with and actually enhanced by us being active in good
relationships. To be successful, rich, powerful without being in good relationships is not a state one
normally desires. It may be a state one settles for, but it cannot be described as the greatest good in
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human life.98 To be in good relationships when missing other goods is many times a more desirable
option than the reverse. This is intensified by the realization that to not be in good relationships will
often mean that one is in bad relationships, as it is difficult to imagine human life without
relationships all together. To live a human life without relationships altogether is a nightmare for
most people. It is often the case that it is more desirable to be in a bad relationship than to not have
any relationships at all. An individual who is active in good relationships will very likely also find
herself in many shallow relationships. These relationships can be good, however they cannot
replace ‘good relationships.’ Their presence adds to an individual’s life, but their absence is usually
not strongly problematic.
A relationship exists when one person who is conscious of herself is also conscious of another
who is not herself. The person is not only conscious of herself and the other, but has the capacity to
act in such a way that would influence the other and can be influenced by the actions of the other.
This requires that both persons exist within a mutual environment that makes the distinction
between the persons possible, while allowing the persons to utilize said environment to act in ways
that would influence the other. By influence I mean the capacity to act in a way that alters the ideas,
emotions and even physical state of another individual.99
There are many kinds of good relationships, because there are many kinds of relationships.
A person’s relationships to her parents is different from her relationships to her siblings, which is
different from her relationships to her friends and different from her relationships to her lover. A
person has the potential to exist within a matrix of different kinds of relationships, where each kind
of relationship has different norms. All relationships might be important to the person and the
person may love all the people with which she has a relationship, however the way she expresses
such love and the rules and expectations in each of these relationships is different. A good parental
relationship is defined by a set of norms markedly different from those underlying a good marital
relationship. In other words, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of influencing and being
influenced by the other which vary according to the kind of relationship in question.
Being in a ‘good relationship’ is not the same as simply acting with goodness towards others.
Acting with goodness towards others is a necessary component of being in a ‘good relationship’,
It is conceivable that someone chooses to be in a state where one is deprived from good relationships. A
person might decide for the good of one person, or for the good of a number of people, to live in such a way
where she is not active in good relationships. This decision would however be compatible with the belief that
the greatest good for human beings is to be in good relationships. It is in the nature of good relationships that
the good of the other is more important that the good of the self. In a world where there is evil of such a kind
as to prevent people from being able to be in good relationships, the kinds of people who are in such
relationships would choose to act sacrificially for the sake of the other. Thus the person would sacrifice her
own good for the sake of increasing other people’s capacity to be in good relationships.
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but it is not sufficient. A person can act with goodness towards others even in the absence of a good
relationship. A good relationship is marked by depth (intimacy). The depth in question describes
how much access and thereby influence the persons have in each other’s lives. Different kinds of
relationships have different depths that are appropriate to the nature of that relationship. In order for
good relationships to develop, a person must be willing to have access and influence in another
person’s life, and be willing to grant access and be influenced by the other. This can be described as
how much a person is ‘in’ the other. This is a beginning of a description of what communion looks
like.100
In order for us to have the capacity to be in such relationships, we need to grow into certain
kinds of persons; persons who tend to act with goodness, or in other words virtuous persons. To act
with goodness towards another person is to act in such a way where the good of the other is the
main concern. This requires not just an intention to benefit the other, but an understanding of what
the good of the other person is. Not only do we need to have the good intentions and good
understanding, but we also need to have the courage to act according to our good intentions and
understanding, even though such an action might be costly. In other words, the kinds of persons
who are able to be active in good relations are those who have love, wisdom and courage. To love is
to want the good of the other, to be wise is to know what the good of the other is and to be
courageous is to be willing to act for the goodness of the other, regardless of the consequences.
An evil action, one that makes a person guilty, is an action that is done with a selfish or
careless intention. It is an action where an individual thinks of what she considers her good as more
important than the good of those around her. This is what causes an individual to act in a way that
violates or injures others. However, not any action that results in some kind of injury is an evil
action. One can think of actions that cause some pain but are nonetheless still considered good. A
person might accept being injured or hurt when it is clear that the pain is not done out of selfish
intention. A person will allow a physician to injure them in order to heal them of a disease or
ailment.
It is also possible for someone with a good intention to act in a way that is considered
morally wrong because of ignorance. Such an action could cause pain, but it is an action that is in
many cases excusable. It could however be inexcusable if the wronged person believes the
ignorance that caused the wrongdoer to commit the wrong to be inexcusable. In this case the
wrongdoer is guilty for their ignorance more than for the action itself, but they are guilty
nevertheless. It is also important to note that it is not only the injury or hurt that mean an evil action
has been committed. It is not always clear what impact an evil action has on others. The impact of
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some actions only appears after long periods of time. This is why sometimes some actions may be
truly evil, even if we cannot immediately see their consequences.
Because of the kind of persons that we are (lacking in love, wisdom and courage), we are the
kind of people who will inevitably wrong and injure one another. Unless an action such as
forgiveness is possible, we have no hope for reconciliation. The paradox we find ourselves in is that
we are creatures who find their ultimate good through being in certain kinds of relationships, but
who at the same time find themselves acting in ways that are destructive to such relationships.
Forgiveness and reconciliation describe the journey to restoration. Their existence is what makes
community not only possible, but also sustainable.
Forgiveness does not seem to fit within a moral framework where the right thing to do is
what is demanded by a list of moral laws. Even if one believes that there is such a thing as a list of
moral laws, forgiveness seems to be an action that cannot be demanded of a person because of a
specific law. In that sense it is not a moral duty. No one is considered immoral if they do not
forgive. However, it is an action that shows that there is something beyond any moral law that is
more significant than the law. That thing is to be in a certain kind of relationship with an other. To
be in a ‘good relationship’ with an other is something that cannot be achieved merely through
adherence to a law, but it is achieved through choosing to make space for the other within oneself
and loving the other beyond the demands of any list of moral laws.

4.1.2 What About Repentance?
“Tom begins to cry. «I wish I could tell you why I did it, Thordis.» «Did what?»
«Raped you» he says, quietly. I blink in disbelief that I heard him correctly. «What
did you say?» «I raped you.» His words hang in the air, sharp as a razorblade. I
want to reach my hand out and touch them. Having read his confession on paper
does nothing to lessen the impact of hearing it spoken out loud like this, to my
face. Suddenly, the dam within me bursts and I double over on the bed. «I’m
sorry» he whispers. «Are you sure that’s how you want to put it?» I whisper back.
«No, I meant forgive me. Forgive me for raping you, Thordis»”101
It is common to think of repentance as a condition for forgiveness. Eve Garrard and David
McNaughton explain that “many people think that forgiveness should only be offered to
wrongdoers who repent of their actions.”102 It is thought of as the role the wrongdoer is required to
do in order to be forgiven. In Nussbaum’s account of transactional forgiveness she mentions
confession and apology as typical aspects of the process of forgiveness. In her account this is seen
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as part of restoring the status of the wronged. It is a “continuation of anger’s payback wish by
another name.”103 Nussbaum’s analysis of this process is influenced by her view of anger and
forgiveness in general. Since, for her, most anger is concerned with status, this form of forgiveness
requires repentance because it is a way to fix the status injury.
Another way to think about this is that repentance is not a condition for the wronged to
forgive, but it is a condition for the wrongdoer to receive forgiveness. It is a condition for
reconciliation. It is closely related to forgiveness because reconciliation is the aim of forgiveness.
However, as argued above, forgiveness does not necessarily have to achieve its aim and it is
possible for a wrongdoer to be forgiven by the wronged, yet remain unforgiven because she has not
repented. In this framework repentance is understood as an action that changes the wrongdoer in
such a way as to make it possible and safe for the relationship between the wrongdoer and the
wronged to be restored.
The essence of repentance is a change of heart (intention) and mind (ideas). To say that the
wrongdoer has repented is to say that the intentions and ideas that were instrumental in her
committing the wrong have been replaced by intentions and ideas that are compatible with and
support the (re)building of a good relationship between the involved parties. Through the act of
repentance the wrongdoer shows the wronged that the required change in intentions and ideas has
taken place. This is normally done through a confession, an apology and a promise. The confession
is the act of affirming the narrative about the wrong committed and shows that the wrongdoer is
aware of the problematic intentions and ideas that were involved. In the apology the wrongdoer
accepts responsibility for the action, but also acknowledges the wrongness of the action. The
promise should reveal that the wrongdoer has replaced the problematic intentions and ideas with
benevolent ones.
In repenting, the wrongdoer is in a place where she can receive forgiveness. Forgiveness
implicitly means that the wronged sees the wrongdoer as guilty. There can be no forgiveness
without this recognition of guilt. In the same way, a wrongdoer who has not acknowledged her
wrong can never receive forgiveness for it. To be forgiven is not only meaningless, but also
insulting, for a person who does not believe she is guilty. Repentance is the step the wrongdoer
takes in order to begin releasing herself from the bond created by the wrong action she committed.
As argued before, the completion of this release is conditioned by the wronged party releasing
herself through forgiving. In other words, repentance is necessary for receiving forgiveness, but not
for giving it. It is understandable that the wrongdoer’s repentance would make it easier for the
wronged party to forgive, however, it is not necessary. This process emphasizes the fact that

103

Nussbaum (2016): 10-11.

36

forgiveness does not mean ignoring or condoning the wrong that has been done. In fact, forgiveness
is only possible when the wrong is acknowledged as truly wrong. In the words of theologian
Miroslav Volf: “To forgive means to accuse the offenders in the larger act of not counting their
offenses against them. What does it mean to receive forgiveness, then? It means to receive both the
accusation and the release from the debt.”104

4.2 Performative Conditions of the Actualization of Forgiveness
4.2.1 Truth and Narrative
“As a result, I prepared myself for all kinds of outcomes: being told that I was
misremembering things; being accused of lies; a downright denial of the whole
ordeal. However nerve-racking and unappealing, all of these possibilities seemed
more desirable to me than the alternative, which was to silence my newfound voice
after it had made such a daring appearance. Given that I had nobody else’s
footsteps to follow in, I decided to follow my heart. Despite all my careful
predictions, the only outcome I didn’t prepare for was the one that I then got: a
reply with a typed confession full of hot regret that disarmed me with its
candor.”105
Forgiveness is an action (and a process) that takes place in relation to the narrative created by the
parties involved about a certain action. It is not the action itself that created the need for
forgiveness, but it is the narrative that surrounds the action to explain and/or justify it. It is easy to
imagine how changing the narrative will change a person’s evaluation of an action. Some aspects of
the narrative are easier to see and agree upon than others. For example, an important part of any
narrative of a wrong committed has to do with the intentions of the wrongdoer. Another element has
to do with the background story and information the wrongdoer had which lead her to commit such
an action. It is always possible that there are elements to the story that the wronged is not aware of.
It is also possible that the wrongdoer has faulty or missing information about the wronged, which
play a role in her deciding to act the way she did. Therefore, it is possible that the action itself might
be interpreted very differently by both parties.
One possible situation in which the relevance of narrative becomes very clear is if both
parties see themselves as wronged while being innocent. Each of them believes a narrative
surrounding the action that results in their seeing themselves as innocent and the other as guilty.
While it is easy to imagine how two people would both feel wronged by the other, it is more
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challenging to imagine the same two people being innocent of wronging one another with regards to
the same situation. If that is the case, it is very likely that these two individuals believe very
different things about what happened and that they are probably missing or are wrong about some
of the details in the narrative they hold about the situation.
The process of forgiveness is then strongly influenced by the narrative each party creates in
order to make sense of the incident in question. So far, it has been assumed that the wrongdoer
really did commit an evil action against the wronged, that the wronged has correctly identified the
wrongdoer and correctly condemned the action and that both parties agree on the narrative
surrounding the action. There are however multiple ways the case could be different. It is possible
that the wronged be mistaken in her belief about what actually took place. This could be a mistake
about the degree of the evil committed or a mistake about the fact that the evil has been committed.
The mistaken belief about the degree of the evil should be corrected in order for the process of
forgiveness to be appropriate. If it is the case that there was no evil action, the correction of the
belief will totally remove any need for forgiveness (and any guilt on the side of the supposed
wrongdoer).
It is possible that the wronged be mistaken in her belief about who committed the action. In
this case the action has been truly committed, however the blame is placed on a wrong person. This
case would result in reconciliation being very difficult, as the supposed wrongdoer would be
unlikely to repent. However, it still may be possible that the wronged would forgive and thereby
release herself from the bond. She will however have false beliefs about the supposed wrongdoer
which will be destructive for the relationship. This problem would be solved by the truth of the
innocence of the supposed wrongdoer being revealed. The real wrongdoer would be guilty and
would remain unforgiven so long as they did not repent.
It is also possible for the wronged to be totally unaware of the evil that has been committed
against her. She might be aware of the pain caused by the injury without being aware of the evil
action that caused the injury. In which case, she will not be able to forgive, but she will in some
sense not be aware of (and may be even unaffected) by the bond created by the evil action. This
would mean that the wrongdoer is bound to the wronged by his guilt. It is in such a case that we see
the significance of confession very clearly. It is only when the wrongdoer confesses that the
wronged is aware of the bond that needs to be resolved. The bond exists even when the wronged is
not aware of it, and thereby the relation between the wronged and wrongdoer is affected by the
bond. This explains why the guilt of the wrongdoer will sometimes push her to confess to the
person who she wronged, even when the wronged was not aware of the evil committed.
This makes clear the value of confession and confrontation. In confession, the wrongdoer
reveals the narrative she holds about the action in question. In confrontation the wronged reveals to
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the wrongdoer her narrative about what happened. Confrontation not only reveals the narrative to
the wrongdoer, but it also requires a reaction from her. Confession and confrontation are elementary
practices to establish and unify the narrative in order for forgiveness to be possible. The aim of
establishing narrative is not merely to agree on any narrative, but it is to agree on what is actually a
true description of what has taken place. It is meaningless to confess and confront when truth is not
the aim. A confession that reveals a narrative that the wrongdoer does not believe to be true is no
real confession. A confrontation that reveals a narrative that the wronged does not believe to be true
is absurd. What might happen in confrontation and confession is that both or either parties come out
with a more accurate narrative, a narrative closer to the truth.
Without either confrontation or confession it is possible for both parties to have different
narratives about what happened because of which they are not aware of the existence of a bond, or
believe that a bond exists where there is actually none. Either confession or confrontation is
sufficient if the narrative is accepted by the other party. The content of confession, when accepted
by the wronged, is sufficient to establish the narrative and so make the process of forgiveness
possible. The content of confrontation, if accepted by the wrongdoer, is also sufficient to establish
the necessary narrative. If the content of the confrontation is not accepted, then no reconciliation
will be possible, the wronged can however still forgive (release herself from the bond, while the
wrongdoer remains bound). When the content of confession is accepted and if the wrongdoer also
apologizes and promises to act differently, the wronged is now in a position to continue further with
the process leading to reconciliation.

4.2.2 Langauge
“In an attempt to give voice to my feelings, I wrote a disgustingly violent poem… It
doesn’t reflect how I feel today, not by a long shot, but it expresses some of the
things I wanted to say to you when I was at my lowest.”106
Taking this issue of narrative a step deeper, it is clear that there can be no narrative without
language. In fact, there can be no narrative of the kind that makes forgiveness possible if we were
not the kinds of beings whom Taylor describes as ‘self-interpreting animals.’ For Taylor, we are the
kinds of beings we are because of our capacity for language. We are the kinds of beings who
experience specific emotions that we could have never experienced had we no language. Any
narrative we live within does not only tell of events, but it is a narrative that involves certain
emotions about these events. Taylor writes:
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“But then we must speak of man as a self-interpreting being, because this kind of
interpretation is not an optional extra, but is an essential part of our existence. For our
feelings always incorporate certain articulations; while just because they do so they open us
on to a domain of imports which call for further articulation. The attempt to articulate
further is potentially a life-time process. At each stage, what we feel is a function of what we
have already articulated and evokes the puzzlement and perplexities which further
understanding may unravel. But whether we want to take the challenge or not, whether we
seek the truth or take refuge in illusion, our self-(mis)understandings shape what we feel.
This is the sense in which man is a self-interpreting animal.”107
Taylor distinguishes between different kinds of emotions we experience. There are what he
calls immediate emotions which are language independent, such as “what we experience in the
dentist's chair, or when the fingernail is rubbed along the blackboard.”108 These are emotions that
we share with non-language animals. Two other types of emotions are ones that have what he calls
‘non-subject referring imports’ and those that have ‘subject-referring imports.’ Taylor defines
‘import’ as “a way in which something can be relevant or of importance to the desires or purposes
or aspirations or feelings of a subject; or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is a
matter of non-indifference to a subject.”109 He uses the term ‘subject-referring’ to describe
“properties which can only exist in a world in which there are subjects of experience.”110 The idea is
that there are emotions that can only be made sense of when thinking of humans as subjects
constituting their social reality and not merely as objects. These emotions cannot be described or
explained in purely objectivistic terms.
To understand the difference between the latter two kinds of emotions, Taylor invites the
reader to imagine attempting to explain the emotion of fear and of shame to Alpha Centaurans,
“who as everybody knows are large gaseous clouds, somehow endowed with sapience, but
unrecognizable by us as living beings, lacking what we think of as sense organs, lacking our notion
of individuality (they agglomerate and redivide in all sorts of ways).”111 We would be able to find
ways to describe fear in objective terms; terms we have in common with the Alpha Centaurans. We
could attempt to reduce fear to a recognition of some kind of danger, which a machine could be
designed to imitate. This would be much more challenging with the emotion of shame. This is
because “the term 'shameful' has no sense outside of a world in which there is a subject for whom
things have certain (emotional) meanings. For the (linguistic) meaning of 'shameful' can only be
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explicated with reference to a subject for whom these (emotional) meanings have weight, and if
there were no such subjects, the term itself would lack sense.”112
Taylor sees emotions that are subject-referring and import-attributing as emotions that we
are only capable of as language animals. This is because our articulation of emotions shapes and
reshapes our emotions. “Language is constitutive of emotion” which means that for Taylor
“experiencing an emotion essentially involves seeing that certain descriptions apply.”113 Such
descriptions, which are essential for something to have import, are not possible without language.
Furthermore, these emotions involve what Taylor calls strong evaluation; that is evaluation that
involves “discriminations of right or wrong, better or worse, higher or lower.”114 Taylor argues that
language is necessary for any strong evaluation.115
These emotions seem to be the kind of emotions that are fundamental to any narrative that
calls for forgiveness. Forgiveness is only an issue when there is a situation that involves emotions
which result from things that are relevant and important to us, i.e. things that have import. We can
only experience such emotions as people who use language. These emotions are also all emotions
that involve strong evaluation. We experience resentment if we believe we have been treated
wrongly. We experience guilt when we believe we have acted in a way that we ought not have acted
in. We sense an obligation to treat people in certain ways and not in others. We find it good to be in
certain kinds of relationships with others and we find it bad when relationships are of other kinds.
Forgiveness is therefore only possible for beings like us, who have the capacity for language.

4.2.3 Are there Unforgivable People?
“Unforgivable. The word rings in my ears. I’m going to [visit] a prison where
innocent people’s rights were violated in the most gruesome ways. I’m going there
with a man who raped me. And on my way, I cross paths with a man who thinks it’s
unforgivable that another motorist nudged his scooter.”116
The first common answer to the question of whether there are unforgivable people is that
unrepentant wrongdoers are unforgivable. The understanding of forgiveness put forward in this
paper however suggests that the wronged can forgive without the repentance of the wrongdoer.
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Regarding the question of whether there are wrongs that are of such kind, that forgiving them would
be morally wrong, I would like to suggest that there are no wrongs that make forgiveness morally
wrong, but that there are wrongs that would make forgiveness, in the absence of any divine
assistance, impossible. Forgiveness is an action and a process that not only has a strong moral
dimension, but it is one that is almost always very costly. It is because of its cost that it can be at
times humanly impossible.
So far this paper has been exploring the structure of forgiveness. This structure is constant to
a great degree throughout the different possible cases of paradigmatic forgiveness. Forgiveness (of
this kind) only exists when a person commits an evil action, thus becoming the wrongdoer, against
another person, who becomes the wronged. The wronged is also the person who has the right to
forgive. Forgiveness cannot be demanded of her, but she can also never be blamed for forgiving,
that is, as long as the understanding of forgiveness is one that says that forgiveness makes
reconciliation possible, aims at reconciliation, but is not sufficient for reconciliation to take place. It
is conceivable that a wronged person who rushes into reconciliation without repentance is doing
something that is morally questionable, or at least foolish. What remains to be answered are not
questions regarding the structure or categories of the action and the process of forgiveness, but
whether the degree and kind of the evil act can make it impossible for someone to forgive.
The idea of forgiveness being costly is based primarily on two observations. First, it is
commonly believed that forgiveness is very difficult. Its difficulty is proportional to the nonnumerical ‘magnitude’ of the evil act. This suggests that the effort and pain of forgiving stand in a
relation of direct proportionality to the non-numerical ‘magnitude’ of the evil committed. Because
there is such a relationship between the ‘magnitude’ of the wrong and the difficulty of forgiveness,
it makes sense to think of forgiveness as having a variable cost. Obviously the question of the
magnitude of evil has a very subjective element to it. It could vary depending on the depth of the
relationship between the parties involved, the moral framework the wronged holds and what she
believes is truly important in her life.
Secondly, forgiveness is often described as releasing someone from a debt and as a gift. The
reason these descriptions have been used for so long in different languages and cultures, is probably
because they help us represent to ourselves what it means to forgive. The language of debt suggests
that by forgiving, the wronged is choosing to forgo receiving that which she rightfully demands. As
argued earlier, to overcome resentment is to decide to bear the weight of the wrong committed
against oneself and to not demand it from the wrongdoer. To forgive a debt, is to bear the weight of
that debt oneself. The language of forgiveness being a gift also implicitly says that it is costly. And
depending on the size of the gift, it will cost more or less. The difference between the analogies and
the reality of forgiveness is that it is easy to understand and to determine the cost of forgiving a debt
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or of giving a gift, while with forgiveness the cost is very difficult to quantify. The cost could be
living without things or people that were very important in a person’s life. It could be that the
wronged is accepting that her life will never be the same. It also could be her accepting that, for
perhaps an indefinite period of time, she will live with various kinds of suffering. Depending on the
cost, forgiveness could be the greatest gift a person has given in her life. Heironymi expresses this
idea beautifully:
“any wrongdoing leaves in its wake some amount of damage or cost, be it physical,
financial, emotional, relational, or social. This is damage which the offender usually cannot
repair («you can't take it back,» as children learn), and which the offended will, in any case,
incur. The persistence of the damage threatens any attempt to leave the past in the past,
insofar as the damage testifies to the deed. The persisting damage cannot be addressed in the
same way as the persisting meaning or guilt. So here's a further thing left for forgiveness to
do: With forgiveness, the offended agrees to bear in her own person the cost of the
wrongdoing and to incorporate the injury into her own life without further protest and
without demand for retribution. (In some cases forgiveness can be uncomfortably intimate:
You must allow me to creatively incorporate the scars that bear your fingerprints into the
permanent fabric of my life, and trust that I can do so.)”117
This also shows why forgiveness is an act of love. It is choosing to bear a price in order to
release some one else of it. In fact, it is in order to release the one who has committed the wrong. It
is an act of sacrifice done for someone who is very easily seen as an enemy. This is why we are
more willing to forgive someone who we deeply love, as long as we love them enough to bear the
cost of forgiveness. A parent is many times willing to forgive their child for very costly mistakes.
They are willing to endure and bear a lot of pain in order to release their child from any debt they
may owe them. In fact, many times they don’t even consider it as a debt, because the default
position is to forgive no matter how costly. It may be so because the relationship between parents
and children is inherently asymmetrical. Parents are expecting to pay high costs for the sake of their
children while expecting very little back. The readiness of most parents to forgive thus reveals
something of the nature of forgiveness. Many people find that they do not have the power to love
the other in such a way. They find it practically impossible to forgive and to release the wrongdoer
from their debt.
When the wronged doesn’t forgive, she continues on demanding the price of the wrong
committed against her from the wrongdoer. She does not accept that she is paying a price for an
action she did not decide to take and one that she does not deserve to be the recipient of. It makes
sense to think that the wrongdoer should be the one paying. The reality, however, is that sometimes
the wrongdoer will never be able to pay in a way that would restore the wronged. The effect of the
evil action could be of such a kind that is irreversible. In that case, the debt is permanent. This may
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result in the wronged wanting the wrongdoer to suffer, even if it will not lead to any restoration. At
least it is an acknowledgment that what the wronged is forced to pay for is not her fault and that the
other person is also paying a price.
Furthermore, to not forgive could mean that the wronged is holding on to the belief that one
day the wrongdoer will be made to pay, and that the wrongdoer’s payment will somehow restore the
wronged. Even though this belief is many times clearly irrational and unrealistic, it is still
frequently very deeply held on to despite its irrationality. There are, however, other beliefs that
make such a belief more plausible. For example, the belief in the existence of an omnipotent and
good God can lead a person to expect that one day this God will hold the wrongdoer to account and
will restore the wronged. It could be a belief that leads people to hold on to their resentment. The
paradox that exists is that for many people this omnipotent and good God is one who expects them
to forgive others, even their enemies.

5. Conclusion
This paper has provided a description of what forgiveness is through the ‘bond model,’ and what
forgiveness does through the ‘economic model.’ It has argued that it is the nature of forgiveness to
aim at reconciliation, even though it does not always achieve it. It has also argued that it is possible
for a wrongdoer to be forgiven by the wronged, while remaining unable to receive this forgiveness
because she has not repented. In such a case the wrongdoer remains guilty, while the wronged is in
the process of releasing herself from the bond that binds her to the wrongdoer by choosing to
release the wrongdoer from the debt she owes her.
The paper has argued that forgiveness is understood as a good action within a framework
that considers being in good relationships as the sommum bonum of an agent. This reveals the
importance of forgiveness as the action and the process that can restore such relationships once they
have been damaged through evil actions. This paper has also argued that for forgiveness to be at all
possible, agents have to be of such a kind as to have the capacity for language. This is also clear as
the process of forgiveness is strongly affected by narrative and truth. Finally, this paper argued that
forgiveness is always costly for the wronged and that there are wrongs that seem to be unforgivable
because of the ‘magnitude’ of the wrong. This, However, may not be the case if, as the Christian
narrative suggests, it is true that divine assistance is available and accessible.
Much remains to be said about forgiveness. Only one simple case of forgiveness has been
discussed here. It is also important to note that understanding forgiveness may be helpful, but it by
no means makes it easier to forgive. The difficulty of the action and of the process is not due to the
confusion surrounding them, but in the most part due to the nature of the agents involved, the nature
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of wrongdoing and the nature of the relationships in question. Nevertheless, clearing up the
confusion removes an extra layer of difficulty and enables better articulation and so better
communication about forgiveness. This is by no means an insignificant achievement.
“His eyes open wide. «Oh my God, did you just say that?» he gasps. Before I know
it, his arms wrap around me and sweep me tight up against him like a ragdoll. I
hug him back, surprised by his strong reaction when the sobs tear through his
throat. His crying shakes my body, and I hear myself whisper into his ear: «It’s
over. I forgive you. It’s over.» We embrace for a long while before he lets go of me,
wipes a tear from his cheek, and says: «I accept your forgiveness.»”118
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